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Abstract
The Fisherian Time Preference and the Evolution of
Capital Ownership Patterns in a Global Economy
Kyoji Fukao and Koichi Hamada
Conventionally economic growth theory was based on the assumption of a
constant rate of time preference. Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld (OJE, 1981)
introduced the rate of time preference that increases with the utility
level. Irving Fisher (The Theory of Interest) has a different opinion,
however, that people are more time impatient at the lower level of income.
This paper assumes a non-monotonic time preference schedule such that
people are more patient at the middle income levels and are less patient
when they are either very poor or rich. Based on a nonlinear savings
function out of wealth implied by such a time-preference schedule, this
paper develops a single-good, multi-country growth model of a global
economy with free capital mobility. The long-i'.'un property of this system
is characterized by three kinds of long-i'.'un equilibrium: the starvation
(fatal attractor) equilibrium, the imperialism equilibria dominated by a
nation or by a group of nations, and the CO::Prosperity equilibrium where
the wealth and the income of countries in the system grow proportionately.
Bifurcation phenomena and the global stability of the system by the
Lyapunov function will be discussed.
Our system has a strong resemblance to some models of ecology where
species compete for their survival (Robert May, Stability and Complexity in
Model Ecosystems). Here we can properly analyze the transition of a debtor
to a creditor country from a global perspective, and make a case for the
pump-priming foreign aid or debt relief policy.
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I.

Introduction
If one's income level improves, will one become more time patient or

less patient?

Many prominent economists discussed this question and the

literature of modern economic growth theory explicitly or implicitly
assumed some relationship between the level of current economic welfare and
the rate of time preference.
Milton Friedman (1957) expressed his view on this matter by drawing a
homothetic indifference map for the intertemporal choice of consumption,
which implies a constant rate of time preference regardless of the income
level.

He proceeded even to suggest the absence of "time preference

proper," in other words, the zero rate of pure time preference when "the
consumer unit correctly assesses the relative value of consumption in the
two years" (Friedman, 1957, p. 12).
For a long time economic growth theory had been based on this
behavioristic assumption of a constant rate of time preference, until Uzawa
(1968), inspired by Koopmans (1960), introduced the rate of time preference
that was an increasing function of the instantaneous consumption level.
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Recent works (e.g. Obstfeld, 1981) utilized this structure to analyze the
process of the international asset accumulation.

The rationale of this

assumption is rarely, however, systematically explicitly stated.

Behind

this assumption, we believe, is hidden the presumption that the asset
holding behavior of economic units or of national economies should exhibit
such a pattern that they achieve a certain target level of wealth relative

1

Koopmans did not deny the possibility that the rate of time preference
might be a decreasing function of the instantaneous utility. See Koopmans,
Diamond, and Williamson (1964), p. 98. Iwai (1972) pursues this line of
research from a somewhat similar viewpoint as ours.
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to income even under a constant return on capital over time.

Decreasing

rates of time preference with respect to instantaneous consumption would
produce unstable asset holding behavior that could hardly be reconciled
with the real balance effect.
Irving Fisher, father of modern theory of consumption choice over
time, had a different message.

It seems worth quoting his argument as a

whole even at the risk of slight redundance.
"Our first step, then, is to show how a person's time-preference
depends on the size of his income.

In general, it may be said that

the smaller the income the higher is the preference for present over
future income.

It is true that a small income implies a keen

appreciation of future wants as well as of immediate wants.

Poverty

bears down heavily on all parts of a man's life, both that which is
immediate and that which is remote.

But it enhances the utility of

immediate income even more than of future income.

This result is

partly rational, because of the importance, by supplying present
needs, of keeping up the continuity of life and the ability to cope
with the future; and partly irrational, because the pressure of
present needs blinds one to the needs of the future.

As to the

rational side, it is clear that present income is absolutely
indispensable, not only for the present, but even as a precondition to
the attainment of future income.

'A man must live.'

Any one who

values his life would prefer to rob the future for the benefit of the
present, so far, at least, as to keep life going.

If one has only one

loaf of bread he would not preserve it for next year; for if he did he
would starve in the meantime.

A single break in the thread of life

suffices to cut off all the future.

And not only is a certain minimum
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of present income necessary to prevent starvation, but the nearer this
minimum is approached the more precious does present income appear,
relatively to future income.
As to the irrational side, the effect of poverty is often to
relax foresight and self-control and tempt one to trust to luck for
the future, if. only the all-absorbing clamore of present necessities
is satisfied
We see, then, that a low income tends to produce a high
time-preference, partly from lack of foresight and self-control, and
partly from the thought that provision for the present is necessary
both for itself and for the future as well."
[Fisher, 1907, Ch. 6; section 5.]
At least, for a low level of income, Fisher's argument seems to be
convincing.

(For psychological evidence see Maital, 1982).

A casual look

of the scatter diagram of the savings ratio and GNP per captia (Figure 1)
tells us that the saving function is not necessarily a constant or a linear
function of the real income level.

Even though we exclude the extreme

observation of the very low savings ratio of Lesotho, 2 we obtain a mild fit
of a nonlinear savings function (see Figure 2).
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume a nonlinear savings schedule as
well as a nonlinear time-preference schedule such that people are more time
impatient at the lower levels of income, become more patient at the middle
levels, and then gradually becomes less patient.

The purpose of this paper

is not to assess the empirical relationship between savings ratios or rates

2
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that another outlier in this
diagram is the United States that saves significantly less than the overall
average saving ratio.
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of time preference and the level of income, but to explore the consequence
of the nonlinear savings behavior resulting from the nonlinear time
preference schedule.

The time preference schedule we consider can be

depicted as in Figure 3.

The declining portion of the schedule

corresponding to lower income levels captures the remarks of Irving Fisher;
the increasing portion corresponding to higher income levels captures the
behavior analyzed by Uzawa and Obstfeld.
By assuming a nonlinear savings function out of wealth implied by such
a nonlinear time-preference schedule, we will develop a nonlinear
single-good, multi-country growth model of a global economy. 3

This system

can be regarded, in a broader sense, as a multi-country version of the
nonlinear growth models developed by Leibenstein (1954) and Nelson (1956)
in the earlier years of the development of economic growth theory.

By

allowing nonlinear savings behavior and studying global rather than local
behavior of the system, we will be able to characterize the long-i:'un
behavior of this multi-country growth model of the Solow (1956) variety.
(See Day (1982, 1983) for a more complex single country model.)
particular, we will discuss three kinds of long-i:'un equilibrium:

In
the

starvation (fatal attractor) equilibrium, the imperialism equilibria
dominated by a nation or by a group of nations, and the co:4?rosperity
equilibrium where the wealth and the income of countries in the system grow
proportionately.

3

Incidentally our system has a strong resemblance to some

The nonlinearity exploited in this paper
On the other hand, most of the nonlinearity
of the nonlinearity in Nelson's, stems from
However, the global qualitative property of
their models would be similar to ours.

concerns the savings behavior.
in Leibenstein's work, and part
the population behavior.
a multi-country version of
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of the models of ecology where species compete for their survival (see,
e.g. May, 1973, also Haken 1983, chapter 10).
Our analysis is global in the two different meanings of the word.

It

is concerned with the development of the total world economy instead of
that of participating countries; it also takes account of the dynamical
property of the system in the large instead of the local stability in the
neighborhood of an equilibrium.
In Section 2, we will discuss the relationship between the
non-monotonic rate of time preference and the savings behavior.

In Section

3, we will present a simple growth model of world capitalism with perfect
capital mobility and sketch the dynamic property of the model with the
monotonic savings behavior.

We begin our analysis of the non-monotonic

savings behavior in a two country setting in Section 4.

The concepts of

starvation equilibrium, imperialistic equilibria and CO::Prosperity
equilibrium will be introduced and the possibility of bifurcations as well
as the global property of the model will be discussed.

In Section 5, we

will illustrate the global characteristics of a three-country model by
simulating dynamic paths of the asset accumulation, and the Lyapunov
stability of a simplified version of the multi-country model.

The economic

implications of our global analysis will be summarized in the concluding
section.

II.

Varying Time Preference and Nonlinear Savings Behavior
In order to discuss the microfoundation of the savings behavior to be

introduced below, let us consider a representative family that solves the
following optimization problem:
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Jo e -otln{c(t) }dt,
co

max
{c(t)}

(1)

subject to:

x(t) = {r(t) - n}x(t) - c(t),

(2)

x(o)

(3)

x(o),

x(t)?; 0,

(4)

c(t)?; 0.

(5)

and

Here o is the rate of time preference for the representative family, which
we assume to be constant at this outset of our discussion.

c(t) and x(t)

are respectively per capita consumption and per capita wealth at time t,
r(t) is the rate of return of wealth at time t, and n is the rate of
population growth rate.

The necessary conditions to these optimization

problems are given by the combination of (2),

i(t) ~ A(t)(o + n - r(t)),

(6)

and
c(t)

1/A(t)

along with the transversality conditions

lim A(t)e-ot?; 0,
t➔co

(7)
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and

lim ).(t) x(t)e

-c5t

0.

(8)

t~

where ).(t) denotes the current value of the marginal contribution of the
state variable x(t) to the utility.
Under the assumption of logarithmic instantaneous utility, (6) can be
written as

c<t)

( 6,)

(r(t) - n - o)c(t)

which, in combination with (2), gives the consumption behavior proportional
to wealth

c(t)

ox(t).

(9)

The resulting dynamical equation can be written as

x<t)

{r(t) -

o - n}x(t).

(10)

This neat form of equation (10) stems from our assumption of
logarithmic instantaneous utility function.

4

If we relax this assumption

even slightly, we will no longer obtain a simple relationship between

4

In fact, this equation gives a microeconomic foundation for a strategic
analysis conducted in Hamada (1965) in which game theoretic interactions
with varying o are analyzed.

8

wealth and consumption. 5

Since we are mainly concerned with the global

rather than local property of the dynamical system, explicit
characterization like (10) would help our analysis a great deal.
It would be ideal if the neat form of equation (10) carries through in
the case of varying, non-monotonic time preference.

Even with the

simplifying assumption of logarithmic utility, the wealth accumulating
equation does not take a simple closed form like (10) if we allow o to
depend on the value of c.
In order to analyze the long-term and global consequence of
non-monotonous savings behavior of many nations, we postulate in the main
part of our paper (Section 4) that savings behavior of jth nation is
governed by the following equations

x.J Ct)

(r(t) -6.(x.(t)) -n} x.(t)
J J
J

j=l, ... ,J

(11)

where r(t) is the rate of returns to physical capital x.(t) that is
J

identical for all the nations due to the reasons to be explained in the
next section.

5

This time o.() is a function defined not on the consumption
J

For example, assume a Paretian utility
-y

U(c(t)) = _C~(t-)_ _
-y

0 < -y < 1,

then we get instead of (6 1 )

.
c(t) =

1
14

(r(t)-n-o)c(t)

In this case c(t) depends not only on x(t) but also on the whole future
time path of the interest rate.
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level but on the level of physical wealth x.(t).

J

The shape of o.(x.(t))

J

J

is, however, assumed to be like the rate of time preference schedule drawn
in Figure 3.

In other words, we will assume in later sections that o.()
J

is a differentiable continuous function such that

,
o.(x.(t)) < 0

J

J

*
if O < x.(t) < xj'
J

and

,
o.(x.(t)) > 0

J

J

if X.* < X.(t),

J

J

where x.* is the turning point of the savings behavior from the Fisherian to
J

the Uzawa region.
The main reason why we consider the accumulation process of physical
capital is for the sake of analytical ease.

At the same time, this

assumption gives our analysis a flavor of the exercise on the long
discussed world imperialism in which capitalists compete for concentration
of physical capital.

Also readers who are keenly concerned with the

microfoundation of any macroeconomic models may feel frustrated because our
standard except
microfoundation appears to fall short of the satisfactory
I
for the case of constant rate of time preference.

We hope, however, that

intriguing consequences to be presented below will justify at least partly
the worthiness of this somewhat bold intellectual experiment.

III.

A Model of World Imperialism with Monotonic Savings Behavior
Let us construct a multi-country growth neoclassical model that sheds

light on the long-i'."un property of the asset-liability structure among
nations. J countries produce the same good by identical linear homogeneous
well-behaved production functions.
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F(K. (t), L. (t))

Y. (t)
J

J

J

L.(t)f(k.(t)),
J

j=l, ... ,J,

J

(12)

where Y.(t), K.(t), L.(t), and k.(t) = K.(t)/L.(t) are respectively output,
1
1
1
1

1

1

capital stock, labor, and per-capita capital stock of the jth country at
time t.

f(k.(t)) is a per-capita production.
1

Assume that labor force is

growing at an identical exponential rate of n, that is L.(t) = L(O)ent,
1

where we set just for simplicity that the relative scale of each nation is
exactly identical.
Assume capital movements take place freely in such a way as to equate
the rates of return to capital r(t):

8F(K.(t), L.(t))
1

8F(K.(t), L.(t))

1

for all i and j
8K.(t)

8K. (t)
1

J

or
f'(k.(t))

f'(k.(t))

1

J

r(t)

for all i and j

(13)

that implies k.(t) = k.(t) = k(t).
1

J

Let x.(t) indicate the per-capita capital stock owned by the j'th
J

nation.

The net per-capita net foreign asset z.(t) owned by the j'th
J

nation is written as

z. (t)
J

x. (t) - k(t).

(14)

J

We will conduct our analysis in terms of x.(t) rather than z.(t).
J

J

to say, z.(t) is negative if the j'th country is a debtor country.
J

Needless
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We combine the savings behavior (11) with this simple growth model. 6
The system of differential equations becomes

x.J (t)

{r(t) - o(x. (t)) - n}x. (t),
J
J

j=l, ... ,J

(15)

J

where r(t) = f'(k(t)) and k(t) =

I x.(t)/J.

j=l J

Before going into a general analysis of the system with non-monotonic
savings behavior, let us start, as a preliminary step, with a two-country
model (J = 2) accompanied by simpler types of savings behavior
corresponding to a constant rate of time preference and that of
monotonously increasing consumption out of physical wealth.

(i) Constant

o.

J

in savings function (15)

Suppose oj is constant in (11).
countries, say o

1

equations (15) (J

If o.'s are identical for two
J

o , then the phase diagram of the pair of differential
2
2) looks like Figure 4(a).

ownership pattern will reproduce itself.
phase diagram will look like 4(b).

The initial relative

Suppose next o

1

< o , then the
2

The economy will eventually settle to

the imperialism (sink) solution with country 1 as the empire and country 2
as the colony unless the initial condition happens to be at B, an unstable

6

This model is an open version of the Solow growth model (Solow 1956)
with the Kaldorian savings faction (Kaldor 1955). For a treatment of this
type of model see Hamada (1965, 1966). For open growth models with saving_
functions proportional to income, see also, for example, Onitsuka (1974)
and Ruffin (1979).
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solution.

This is a special case of the phenomenon that more patient

individuals eventually own the whole world (Ramsey 1928, Bewley 1982, Ryder
1985).

Equilibrium A and B corresponds to the stable and unstable

equilibrium discussed in the strategic analysis with
Hamada (1965).

o.

J

as strategies in

This abnormality was cleverly avoided in Buiter (1981)

because he analyzed the overlapping generation model.

There the difference

of the rate of time preference has only a limited effect because the chain
of planning for the future was blocked by the lack of intergenerational
linkage.

(ii) Increasing
If

o.i

o.i

as a function of the net wealth

is a monotonic increasing function of wealth x.(t), then the
i

phase diagram will look like 4(c).
steeper than x2(t) = 0 locus.
solution C.

It can be shown that x (t) = 0 locus is
1

The economy will approach to a CO:j)rosperity

The local behavior around C is thoroughly analyzed by Kawai

and Okumura (1988).
The age old discussion of the transformation of a country from debtor
through creditor to mature creditor should be analyzed from this type of
global perspective rather than from a small-country perspective because all
the countries cannot end as creditors on the globe which is by itself a
closed system.

It is amusing to see that competitive species models in

ecology have identical analytical structure, and that exactly the same
phase diagrams are written for those models (See Haken, 1968, p. 307).

IV.

Nonmonotonic Savings Behavior and Imperialistic Equilibria
Let us develop a two-country model of the world economy with free

capital movements by introducing a non-monotonic savings behavior.

Since
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the nonlinearity could create rather complicated interaction, we will
illustrate the global structure of the model by the following numerical
example.

Consider a world consisting of symmetric countries.

Technology

as well as consumption function is identical in the two countries.
only possible difference is in their initial wealth.
two classes of economics, capitalist and labor.

The

We may conceive it as

The labor class consumes

all their income, and the non-human capital is owned by capitalists.
The per-capita production function we adopt is:

f(k(t))

lf _f

where k(t)

21J=l

x.(t)}
J

The rate of return r(t) is thus given by

1

r(t)

~(t) - 2

4./2
Let n =

1
or 1.25 percent.
80

The o.(x.(t)) is symmetric between the two
J J
countries, so that we can write it without subscript for the function

o(x.(t))
J

x. (t)
J
800

Thus the dynamical equation for capital accumulation becomes

14

x.J (t)

{

1
- -

2

1

tr I

j=l

x.<t)J

2

J

1, 2.

j

Then the phase diagram of this system is drawn as Figure 5.
three kinds of stable equilibria:

There are

the co-prosperity eguilibrium C, the

imperialism equilibria (A with country 1 as the empire and country 2 as the
colony, and B with country 2 as the empire and country 1 as the colony),
and the starvation (fatal attractor) eguilibrium 0.

There are one unstable

equilibrium F and four saddle-point equilibria D, E, G, and H.

The phase

plane can be divided into four regions by the ridge (water-shed) lines FG,
FH, FI and FJ as in Figure 6.

From Region I, the path converges eventually

to the co-prosperity equilibrium C; from Region II and III, the path
converges respectively to A and B the imperialism equilibria; and alas from
Region IV to the starvation equilibrium at the Origin!
It is easy to check that, in the closed economy consisting of a single
economy Nation 1,

point F' (projection of Fon x

equilibrium and C' the stable equilibrium.

1

axis) is the unstable

For the sake of the existence

of the foreign nation, Nation 2, the survival region where nation 1 is
capable of avoiding starvation is extended to the regions with horizontal
shade.

Figuratively, in Region FGF' Nation 1 can take off because it can

exploit the existence of Nation 2 because of the relative wealth at the
initial point; in Region HFF" surrounding B, labor in nation 1 can survive
because of the colonization by Nation 2.
Similarly, Region surrounded by F"FJ with vertical shade implies that
Nation 1 starting from this region can attain nothing but the colonized
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equilibrium Bin this world economy even though Nation 1 could attain the
state corresponding to C in the absence of Nation 2 after a long while.
This path may as well be the Pareto efficient path.

Needless to say, the

Pareto efficiency does not exclude the situation in which one nation is
colonized.

In this region, Nation 1 may choose to close the economy

against foreign capital, and after a while, may move to Region I.

From

there Nation 1 can adopt a free capital movement policy to attain the
co-prosperity equilibrium C.
Finally, one would be able to imagine the situation when a Nation, say
Nation 1 suddenly becomes more frugal.

Then x (t) = 0 contour GFECDA will
1

shift to the right, point C and D will move to the right and finally
collapse into a single point (see Figure 7).

At that tangency point a

bifurcation phenomenon will take place and the co-prosperity equilibrium
will vanish from the globe, leaving only the possibility of the
imperialistic equilibria.
Needless to say, this analysis is only an illustration of a typical
case.

More general analysis can be done, for example, utilizing the

topological approach explained in Hirsch and Smale (1977).

V.

The Global Property of the Multi-Country Model.
We can extend the above exercise into three or more country cases.

In

order to visualize the global property of a three-country case, let us take
the symmetric example with the same production function as in the previous
section.

X. (T)
J

Then the basic differential equations become

1

1

{ - - r3
4jT

1

3

I

j=l

x.<t)J
J

-2

x. (t)

J

[ 800
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In this case there are 8 stable long--i:'un equilibria:
(i)

1 co:::Prosperity eguilibrium

(ii)

3 oligarchy eguilibria, each of which has two empires and
one colony.

(iii) 3 imperialism eguilibria, each of which has one empire and two
colonies.
(iv)

1 starvation eguilibrium.

Corresponding to these equilibria, the initial endowment in x ,x ,x space
1 2 3
can be divided into 8 regions. Our simulation exercises give the following
pictures.
If we slice the space by simplexes, or more rigorously magnified
simplexes, such that

3

I

j=l

X.

J

M,

and if we reduce the number M, then the initial condition can be divided as
shown in 8(a) to 8(d).

Suppose we approach this three dimensional space

from the distance towards the origin.

First, if M > 1.68, then we will

observe the initial points leading to all the seven equilibria but the
starvation eguilibrium (Figure 8(a)).

If 1.68 > M > 0.717, the initial

points leading to starvation eguilibrium will replace those leading to the
co-prosperity equilibrium.

If 0.717 > N > 0.173, then those leading to

oligarchy equilibria will disappear.

Finally, of course, if 0.173 > M,

then the simplex will shrink further leaving no room for survival on this
globe.
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Then, can we say nothing about the global property of these nonlinear
models?

The work of ecologists (e.g. May 1973) teaches us that we can at

least handle the following simple case with linear increasing function o(x)
and the quadratic technology.
Consider a multi-country model with the production technology

f(k)

>

a

0

J

I

where k

x./J, and saving function (15) with o(x)
J

j=l

px,

p

> 0.

That is,

(16)

j=l, ... ,J

{r(k) -n -px.}x.,
J J

x.
J

where r(k) = f' (h) = - k + a.
Then the system of the nonlinear equation (16) can be written as

J

x.

{a - n -

J

I

m=l

where a. . =
JJ

Ila.Jm I

p

+ J

-1

a.

Jm

X

} X.,

J

m

, and a.

Jill

J

-1

for j

,,r,

k.

is a symmetric matrix and positive definite.

Assume a - n > 0,

, x * , ... , x * ) where
and define the unique co-prosperity equilibrium x * = (x*
3
2
1
x.* = (a -n)/(p+l).
J

Then the following magnitude satisfies the conditions

of Lyapunov function: (see, e.g. Haken 1983, pp. 124-125.

L

J
I {xJ.

j=l

*

- x . in x . } J
J

L
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where

J

I

L=

*

{X •

J

j=l

-

*

X.

J

in

*

X•}•

J

(i)

*
Lis non-negative and vanishes at x,

(ii)

Lis positive,

and
dL
( iii) dt
=

-I
j ,m

* a.Jm (xm - x m* )
(xJ. - xJ.)

:S

O with equality only at x

*

Hence, the system is globally stable (May 1973, pp. 54-55, see also
Lucas and Stokey 1984 for a discrete analogue of this problem with two
economic agents.). 7

VI.

Concluding Remarks
By introducing a non-monotonic savings schedule, we have seen that the

process of economic developments can be formulated into a dynamical model
similar to models of competing species in ecology.

Despite its rather

simple set of assumptions and dynamical apparatus, this model suggests a
wide range of economic implications.

We will list some of them as follows.

(1) The old debate on the stages of economic development related to the
shift from a debtor status to a lender status (cf Onitsuka 1974).

Since

every country cannot become net lenders at the same time within the (by
itself, closed) world economy, we need a general equilibrium or
global-scale analysis like the one analyzed in this paper.

Depending on

the relative propensity of savings and on the stage of income levels, such
7

The reasoning holds if

is symmetric.
function:
L*

I

jm

Ila.Jm I

is positive definite regardless whether it

Also the following function will also serve as a Lyapunov

* a. (x - x * ) .
(xJ. - x.)
J
Jm m
m
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a development of borrowing or lending phases can actually be explained by
the arrows in the phase diagrams that cross the forty-five degree line.

(2) Initial conditions on capital endowments have crucial effect on the
long--t"un destiny of a nation.

Depending on which side of the water-shed

curve a nation places itself at the initial moment, the long--t"un path of
the nation may take completely different directions.

Random shocks into

the system may alter the destiny of a nation from a path towards an empire
or co-prosperity to a path towards a colonized nation, if we disregard the
path towards starvation.

In this vein, a case may be made for a

pump-priming foreign aid and a debt relief to troubled developing
countries.

If the Fates push a nation into the path towards a colonized

nation or towards starvation, why not let an angelic hand help salvage the
nation into being a region of future co-prosperity?

Even though the

absolute magnitude of aid or relief is small, if it is done in the
neighborhood of the critical water shed line, then the nonlinearity of the
system may enable the nation to enjoy a long lasting economic benefit.

(3) The savings behavior has a crucial influence on the long--t"un state of a
national economy.

If, in Japan, or in Newly Industrialized Economies

(NIEs), the saving propensity dramatically rises, then the bifurcation
phenomenon explained above may emerge and push these countries into a
long~un owners of the world capital.

On the other hand, if the savings

propensity of, say the United States or the United Kingdom, were to decline
for any reason such as fiscal deficits, then the country would fall into
the debtor's trap towards possible colonization by high savings countries
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(see Hamada and Iwata, 1989, for some possible scenarios regarding the
United States, Japan and West Germany).
Needless to say, there is no contradiction between the colonization of
a part of the world and Pareto optimality.

As suggested in Section 2, the

non-linear savings behavior may be a result of optimizing behavior.

The

global outcome may well be Pareto optimal given certain initial conditions.
The phase diagrams for the two-country case and simulation analysis
for the three-country case clarifies the benefit and cost of living in a
world community with other nations.

A nation that would not survive in

absence of other nations may be able to survive because of the presence of
other nations that function as possible lenders or borrowers.

On the other

hand, a nation that would be able to achieve the long;:-un development
corresponding to the co-prosperity equilibrium may end up being colonized
if a rich nation exists along with her.

The existence of a partner

elevates the level of insurance against starvation of a nation, but
enhances the risk of being victimized as her colony.

The phase diagrams

indicate the significance of inequality as well as that of poverty.

(5) Under the above circumstances, there is some case for protectionist
policy on the part of the developing country against foreign investment.
By closing the country against foreign capital, a country may carry itself
to the region from which opening of the country would lead to the
co-prosperity equilibrium.

In that circumstance, xenophobia or

protectionism against foreign capital may prevent the colonization of the
country in the long run though at the sacrifice of the present national
consumption level;
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We do not intend to defend ourselves against all the possible
criticisms on our simplicity or arbitrariness of the assumptions employed
in our model.

In particular, the abstraction from terms of trade by

assuming a single commodity growth model may exaggerate the effect of the
difference of the savings behavior between low-income and high income
countries.
We do hope, however, that this paper will generate more interest in
the global analysis of a non-linear economic system.

The recent revival of

the theory of economic growth (e.g. Lucas 1988, Romer 1986) seems to
suggest that the natural direction of research is towards non-linear models
of development.

In mathematics, in many natural sciences and in some

social sciences, new interest is emerging on the global behavior of
non-linear systems ... not to mention the highly popularized topics such as
chaos (cf. Day 1982, 1983) and fractal geometry.

This paper, we believe,

presents just one example of many approaches in these growing related areas
of study that seem to be potentially effective to improve our understanding
of the evolutionary process in our economic universe.
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Figure 1
GNP per capita and saving ratio of 104 countries in 1986.

Note:

The saving ratio is the ratio of gross domestic saving to gross

do~estic product.

The data taken from World Bank, World Developme nt Report

of 1986, Table 1 and Table 5.

All the available data are plotted.
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Figure 2
Fitted nonlinear saving function.

Note:

The data are the same as in Figure 1.

Lesotho is excluded.

The second order polynomia l curve is fitted by

ordinary least-squ ares method.

.

The extreme observati on of

The fitted equation is

Y-= 11.137 + 3.2X - 0.167SX 2

R - 0.49

where Y and X were saving ratio (percent) and GNP per capita (thousand
dollars) respectiv ely.
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Figure 4(c).
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Four Regions
I:
II:

The path converges to the co-prosperity
Country 1 becomes an empire, equilibrium C.
III:

IV:

Country 2 becomes an empire

The path converges to the starvation equilibrium 0
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I: The path converges to the ~Q:::R[OSR~ritI eguilibriwn
Country 1 and 2 become empires.
II:
III: Country 2 and 3 become empires.
Country 1 and 3 become empires.
IV:
Country 1 becomes an empire.
V:
Country 2 becomes an empire.
VI:
VII: Country 3 becomes an empire.
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